

regional parties. Hence, they had to form alliance with the regional parties to gain in the Parliamentary Elections.

The AIADMK won a massive electoral victory. On 10th February, 1985 MGR was sworn in as the Chief Minister for the third consecutive term. The years between 1985-1987 were full of strife and factionalism within the ruling party, bomb blasts, and competitive violent expressions of support for different Tamil militant groups of Sri Lanka. The DMK began anti-Hindi-agitation, pulling out the trusted instrument of Tamil nationalism once again, in an effort to regain lost territory. The agitation gathered momentum when its leader, M. Karunanidhi, was arrested. On 9th December, 1986, the Hindi Prachar Sabha was bombed, and on 11th December the Madurai post office and Singanallur railway track were blasted. On the 22nd December the Air India booking office at Madras and on the 23rd the Trichy-Erode passenger train was blasted. The permutations and combinations of various Tamil parties and the rise and fall of their political fortunes left a residue of cynicism, but also of synthesis. The cultural politics was interwoven with public policy, though with the vote-catering capacity of symbols as the main strategic consideration (Mitra 2006, p. 123). Development of the 1980's clearly indicates that the higher interests can not override the mass mood and sentiments. After the death of MGR there was clash between Jayalalithaa and MGR's wife Janki. The unsavoury infighting between the two factions of AIADMK led to the Election Commission 'Freezing' the AIADMK's election symbol of 'two-leaves'. The resultant confusion helped the DMK come into the power in the 1989 elections, winning 155 of the 234 assembly seats. Both factions of the AIADMK-the AIADMK(JR) and the AIADMK(JL)-were humiliated. Despite the humiliation, however, Jayalalithaa had scored an important political point (Thakurata, Raghuraman 2007, p. 317).

Jayalalithaa emerged as the undisputed leader of the AIADMK, with her supporters anointing her puratchi thalavi (revolutionary leader) in an obvious allusion to the sobriquet conferred on MGR. Janaki faded into oblivion and most other AIADMK leaders who had supported her swallowed their pride and pleaded with Jayalalithaa to let them back into the party. The most important event was that the party had got back its election symbol, 'two-leaves' through which voters

all over the state recognized the AIADMK candidate on the ballot papers. In the 1991 assembly elections, the party's performance was impressive. This time, the AIADMK-Congress alliance won in 224 of the state's 234 assembly constituencies, a performance that has not been bettered before or since by any alliance in Tamil Nadu. The DMK was left with just two MLAs in the assembly, one of them the deposed Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi (Ibid., pp. 317-318).

The complete rout of the DMK in the assembly elections in June 1991 has to be understood in terms of the numerous interacting processes. The AIADMK's political campaign, sought to project the DMK as corrupt, anti-women, immoral and itself as the true successor of MGR. The ideological and political dissonance within the DMK mainly due to the emergence of the Pattali Makkal Katchi (DMK); the DMK's developmental and welfare policies which alienated or caused its disaffection among certain sections; and the impact of the AIADMK + Congress(I) alliance which consolidated the anti-DMK votes (Suresh, 1992, pp. 2313-2321).

Since then there has been fairly dramatic developments in Tamil Nadu politics. Jayalalithaa's first term as Chief Minister saw her adopt an imperious style of functioning. During her first tenure, Jayalalithaa, was also perceived as a corrupt leader- one who used power to confer undue favours on those who were close to her. As the 1996 Lok Sabha and State Assembly Elections drew near, it had become increasingly clear that Jayalalithaa's charisma had begun to fade away. The voters were disillusioned with her government and fed-up with her autocratic and corrupt ways. The Congress in the state, having seen the writing on the wall, tried to preside the central leadership of the party that striking an alliance with the AIADMK for the elections would prove suicidal. P.V. Narasimha Rao, who was then Prime Minister and Congress President, however, insisted on an electoral pact with Jayalalithaa. This led to a revolt in the state unit, with almost the entire local leadership quitting the Congress to form the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC). The TMC then struck an alliance with the DMK. In the Assembly Election that followed DMK-TMC alliance romped to victory, winning 212 of the 234 seats. Tamil Nadu had rejected Jayalalithaa almost as decisively as it had voted her to power just five years earlier. (Thakurata, Raghuraman 2007, pp.

318-319). Election results of 1996 reflects that the people of Tamil Nadu had become politically more aware. They rejected the person involved in corrupt practices. This was one of the indications of effective political democracy.

The first thing the DMK government did after assuming power was to get the state administration to institute a slew of corruption cases against Jayalalithaa, charging her with impropriety in land allotments, import of coal, foreign exchange transactions and so on. Special courts were set-up to deal with these cases. At the behest of the DMK government, police officials raided her residence at Poes Garden. Jayalalithaa was arrested and put in jail. This, as later events proved, was an error of judgment on the part of the DMK government. In 1998, AIADMK made an alliance with the BJP for Lok Sabha polls, which proved to be a victory. In the September – October 1999 Lok Sabha elections, political alliances in Tamil Nadu had changed drastically from what they were a year earlier. BJP was now in an alliance with the DMK, as were smaller parties like the PMK, the MDMK and the TRC. The DMK led alliance was winner (Ibid., pp. 319-323).

In May 2001, Assembly elections were held in Tamil Nadu. It was generally believed that the AIADMK would be able to defeat the DMK in the elections. Jayalalithaa expecting to be the next Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu seemed an almost foregone conclusion. She filed her nomination as a contestant from four separate constituencies but her nomination papers were rejected in all the four constituencies. In two constituencies (Krishna giri & Andipatti), nomination-papers were rejected on the ground that she had been convicted in a criminal case and hence, could not contest elections. And in two other constituencies (Bhuvanagiri & Pudukottai), nomination papers were rejected by returning officers on the ground that according to section 37(7)(b) of Representation of People Act, 1951, prohibited a person from contesting elections from more than two constituencies simultaneously. Thus, Jayalalitha was unable to contest assembly elections that saw the AIADMK emerging as the ruling party. The party on its own won 132 seats and with its allies (the Congress, the left Parties and the PMK) won 173 seats in the house of 234 members. Jayalalithaa was sworn in as Chief Minister because law provided for a person who was not

elected member of the assembly to become a Chief Minister provided such a person was elected to the assembly within a period of six months. Soon, the Chennai High Court upheld Jayalalithaa's appeal against her conviction in the TANSI land case. Thereby clearing the way for her to become Chief Minister once again. She was subsequently elected to the assembly from Andipatti. Soon after she returned as Chief Minister in March 2002, Jayalalithaa left nobody in doubt that the DMK and others in the opposition would have to pay for the 'wrongs' done to her during the DMK's stint in power. A slew of corruption cases were filed against Karunanidhi and some of those who had been ministers in his government. Officials who were seen as close to the DMK were transferred in en-mass. The extent to which Jayalalithaa's quest for 'revenge' became clear when policemen arrested Karunamidhi from his home in the middle of the night (Ibid., pp. 327-328).

Subsequently, in July 2002, the Tamil Nadu government threw another bombshell when it had V. Gopalaswamy (who prefers to be known as vaiko) arrested under POTA on the ground that he had made speeches supportive of the banned LTTE. All these paid to the AIADMK in 2006 Assembly elections. Despite the AIADMK's attempts to match the DMK in announcing populist schemes, such as providing rice at Rs.2 per kg and free television sets, Jayalalithaa and her party lost the assembly polls in May 2006. She had tried very hard to change her image of being a haughty and arrogant leader. After dismissing many striking state government employees, she agreed to reinstate them. None of these moves eventually helped her in the assembly elections. The DMK emerged as the single largest party in Tamil Nadu after polling 26.45 per cent of the votes and winning 96 seats. Its biggest ally, the Congress, won 34 seats, a huge improvement from 2001 elections when the party won only 7 seats. The alliance obtained 44.73 per cent of the votes, around 4.7 per cent more than its opposing coalition. Tamil Nadu politics has been influenced greatly by its film personality, Vijayakant, the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK). DMDK played the role of spoiler by fielding candidates in as many as 206 out of 234 seats in the assembly; the party's candidates were placed third in many constituencies and indirectly worked towards the defeat of AIADMK candidates. Infact, the DMDK

polled 8.38 per cent of the total votes polled in the state, which was almost equal to the vote share of the Congress and four times more than the vote share of the BJP (2.02 per cent) (Ibid., pp. 328-329).

An interesting fallout of the 2006 Assembly Elections in Tamil Nadu has been that the Congress and the DMK had become more dependent on each other. The DMK was for the first time heading a minority government in the state with the Congress as one of its partners, while the DMK was an important constituent of the UPA government in New Delhi (Ibid., p. 329).

Thus, it can be stated that the state politics of Tamil Nadu revolves mainly around two regional parties DMK and AIADMK. Other parties like MDMK, PMK, DMDK etc. are there in Tamil politics but not playing as much role as these two parties are. The reason for the emergence of regional parties in state lies in the culture of Tamil Nadu, in other words Tamil nationalism provided routs for the regionalization of Tamil politics. Other reason that is analysed, is the role of national parties in the state. Congress's authoritative governance worked as a fertilizer for a plant which was swon by these parties even before the independence. Demand for Dravidnadu and agitation against Hindi are the issues which made DMK and AIADMK popular in the state. National Parties viz. Congress/BJP failed to pursue such demands of the people in the state. At last it is clear that Tamil Nadu is fully under the rule of regional parties and national parties have never been successful to form the government in the state.

DMK which was the movement against Brahmin in 1920s, slowly emerged as a strong regional political party of Tami Nadu. The DMK demanded for Dravidnad for Dravidian till mid 1960's. The party gained popularity by opposing the Hindi as a National Language. DMK launched various anti-Hindi agitations till 1967. In 1967 elections it became successful to gain power in Tamil Nadu and got the 25 seats for Lok Sabha. The party got this position only because it propogated that the north was dominating the south in socio-political field. After holding the powers in state the DMK started to pressurize the Central Government to review centre-state relations. The party demanded more power for the states through the Rajamanar Committee. The DMK also got the opportunity to support

Central Government in 1969, when Congress split into Congress(R) and Congress(O). That was the first time when a regional party supported the national party to hold power at the centre.

After 1967 the Congress never came to power in Tamil Nadu. Only in 1971 Congress(R) under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi made an alliance with DMK. It shows that the national parties lost the hope to gain majority or power in the state. DMK led alliance came to power once again. In 1971 when Mrs. Gandhi requested to DMK to give up the demand for greater autonomy the DMK leader Karunanidhi agreed with the views of the new Congress, but continued to oppose the imposition of Hindi.

In 1971 DMK's prominent leader Mr. MGR was suspended from the party. MGR formed the new party named as AIDMK later renamed as AIADMK. Since then, Tamil politics has been the politics of DMK and AIADMK. The newly emerged AIADMK failed to gain many seats in 1971 but in the 1977 it captured the power at state with 130 seats, DMK bagged only 48 seats and the Congress(I) only 27 and CPI(5). This made almost clear that the people of Tamil Nadu does not want national parties in the State. MGR introduced mid-day-meal scheme and many other developmental programmes in the state. MGR died in 1987 but the party held power till the 1989. Due to developmental programmes of MGR, AIADMK got that opportunity. In 1989 AIADMK lost power and DMK came into the power in the state. AIADMK lost the 1989's election because of defection in the party. But in 1991 AIADMK made an alliance with the Congress. The alliance succeeded in getting majority. Since then DMK and AIADMK governed the state turn-by-turn. These parties became more important after 1989 at the national level in making and unmaking of centre governments. These parties are the important alliance partners of the NDA and UPA. Being an alliance partner these parties always bargained with the centre government.

But the detailed study of these parties show that the ideologies of these parties are not only state confined. But they are now nationalistic in view. Although these parties are demanding more powers to the states but they are not

anti-national. These parties believe in developmental programmes and policies. There is no scope of national parties to gain power at the state's level.

POLITICS OF PUNJAB

ROLE OF SHIROMANI AKALI DAL

Perhaps no other state of India has suffered so many territorial and political changes as Punjab has. In 1947, the partition divided the country into India and Pakistan. The Punjab, which has come to acquire a distinct identity, was also partitioned and its boundaries were fixed in accordance with the Radcliffe Award announced on 18th August 1947 (Anand 1976, p. 262).

That segment of the Punjab which continued to form the part of India (first called East Punjab, then Punjab) inherited 34% of the area and 47% of the population of the Punjab of pre independence. The Indian Princely states in this area were grouped together and integrated into a new political unit called PEPSU (that is Patiala and that East Punjab States Union) in 1948. On 1st November, 1956 PEPSU was merged into Punjab. Exactly ten years later, Punjab was reorganized on linguistic basis into the Punjabi speaking state of Punjab and the Hindi speaking state of Haryana. The hilly areas of the composite Punjab were merged into Himachal Pradesh. The city of Chandigarh with some of its surrounding villages came to constitute a Union Territory. It has been estimated that Himachal Pradesh gained 23% of the territory and 7% of the population of the composite Punjab. The Hindi speaking state of Haryana inherited 35.8% of the territory and 37.37% of the population. The remainder, after excluding Chandigarh Union Territory, came to constitute the new Punjab. The reorganization of Punjab in 1966 was carried out primarily under pressure from the Sikhs in the Punjabi speaking areas of the state (Ibid., pp. 262-263).

The Shiromani Akali Dal is a regional political party of Punjab. It claims to represent India's Sikh community. While some scholars of Indian politics, have considered regionalism to be the post-independence phenomenon, thereby maintained that most of the regional parties came into prominence only after the bargaining culture developed in the late 1950s and mid 1960's. But the Akali Dal in Punjab traces its origin in 1920 (Kumar 1988, p. 107).

Akalis did not start as a political party or even a political movement. On the contrary, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) traces its origins to an organization set-up primarily for religious reform within the Sikh community. This forerunner of today's SAD was Gurudwara Sewak Dal, formed in December 1920 to raise and train volunteers for what came to be known as the Gurudwara Reform Movement. The primary objective of the movement was to break the stranglehold of the Mahants (priests) on gurudwaras since they had acquired a reputation for corruption and misuse of their position for personal gratification. The Gurudwara Sewak Dal was renamed the Akali Dal in 1921 and SAD the following year (Thakurata & Raghuraman 2007, pp. 361-362). Basically, the organization aimed to liberating Gurudwaras from the Governments control later. With passage of time, it became highly organized political party with the branches in the Gurudwaras known as the Akali Jatha all over the country (Misra, 1988, p. 125). Akali Dal's programmes and policies since independence, have always moved around Sikh communalism and regionalism. As a communal party, it looks upon all problems of politics from a sectional angle, and as a regional party, it necessarily seeks for a larger degree of autonomy within the frame work of Indian Federalism (Anand 1976, p. 263).

After independence the Akali Dal decided to join the Congress government in the hope that it would help it in protecting the special privileges of the Sikhs and their separate identity. In the circumstances that came to prevail in Punjab after independence the idea of a Punjabi Suba was conceived. The Akali Dal had submitted a memorandum to the sub-committee on Minorities of the Constituent Assembly demanding, among other things, reservation of 50 seats for the Sikhs in the Punjab Assembly, and 5 per cent seats in the central legislature and communal representation for the Sikhs. Minority sub-committee rejected the demand. The Akalis now fell back on Punjabi Suba as the sole means of attaining their objective of a dominant position for the Sikhs in the Punjabi-speaking areas of the province. The political convention of the Akali Dal held in 1949 adopted Punjabi Suba as its demand. The demand was incorporated in the 1951 election manifesto of the Dal (Datta 1993, pp. 62-63). Period from 1947 and 1951 was marked by the political instability but it helped the Akalis to infiltrate in the Congress to further the

interest of the Sikh community. The Akali Dal contested the first General Elections of 1952 all alone after its break with the Congress in 1950, on the issue of a Punjabi-speaking state within the Indian Union. The Akali Dal manifesto declared, 'the true test of democracy in the opinion of the Shiromani Akali Dal, is that the minorities should feel that they are really free and equal partners in the destiny of their country, (a) To bring home this sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that there should be a Punjabi-speaking language and culture. This will not only be step in the fulfillment of the pre-partition Congress programmes and pledges, but also in the entire conformity with the universally recognized principles governing formation of province, (b) The Shiromani Akali Dal is in favour of formation of provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis throughout India but it holds it is a question of life and death for the Sikhs for a new Punjabi-speaking province may give Sikhs the needful security. It believes in the Punjabi speaking provinces as an autonomous unit of India (Misra 1988, p. 137).

The results of the 1952 General Elections provided the Akali Dal and the Congress with a communal response from the electorate. The Congress was supported by a large majority of the Hindus and the Scheduled Castes, and the Akali Dal was supported by a majority of the Sikhs. The Akali Dal secured 33 seats with 15 per cent of the total votes polled, whereas the Congress secured 122 seats with 35 per cent of the total votes (Wallace & Roy 2003, p. 370).

After 1952, the demand for a Punjabi Suba became intense which gave the Akali Dal control over the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). This was a clear indication of the support of the Sikhs to the agenda of Punjabi Suba. A commission was appointed for the reorganization of the state on a linguistic basis in December 1953. This led to the intensification of assertions on communal lines. A section from the Punjabi Hindus launched an agitation infavour of "Maha Punjab" irrespective of the language. In 1954 the Akalis launched an agitation in support of a Punjabi Suba. A number of processions were taken out to mobilize the people infavour of Punjabi Suba (Ibid., pp. 370-371).

The demand for the Punjabi Suba had been made the basis of the morcha by the Akalis in 1955 when about 10,000 Akalis gave court arrest. They had also

submitted a memorandum to the States Reorganisation Commission for the reorganization of Punjab on linguistic basis (Anand 1976, p. 263). The State Reorganisation Commission (SRC) which considered the question in the national context recommended the merger of PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh with Punjab. The demand for a separate Punjabi speaking state was rejected primarily on three grounds (Datta 1993, p. 63). The Akali Dal protested against the recommendations of the SRC and urged the Government of India to devise ways and means for the creation of a Punjabi speaking zone of Punjab and PEPSU. It organized agitations and mass rallies which forced the Government of India to initiate a dialogue with the Dal. The dialogue resulted in the Nehru-Master Tara Singh Pact in terms of which Himachal Pradesh was not to constitute a part of Punjab. It was agreed to bifurcate Punjab into Punjabi-speaking and Hindi speaking regions. As a part of the agreement, PEPSU was merged into Punjab on 1st November, 1956. This formula helped the Congress to accommodate communalists of both varieties. In the existing situation, this was acceptable to the Akali Dal. Many Akali Dal leaders left the Dal and joined the Congress. The Akali Dal could not contest the elections of 1957 (Ibid., p. 64), though Master Tara Singh opposed some Congress candidates in his individual capacity. The Akalis resumed their political activities in 1959. Following their convincing success in the elections of 1959 to the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC), the Akalis launched their morchas in 1959 and 1961. Over 50,000 Akalis courted arrest. Sant Fateh Singh, then a new recruit to Akali politics, sponsored by Master Tara Singh, and Master Tara Singh himself undertook 'fast unto death' with solemn religious vows that they would not break their fasts unless the Punjabi Suba was formed. These fasts, also failed to achieve the intended results. Sant Fateh Singh was the first to undertake 'fast unto death'; but Master Tara Singh persuaded the Sant to break his fast. Later on Master Tara Singh began his 'fast unto death', he also broke it for the promise that a commission would be appointed to look into the general question of discrimination against the Sikhs. The Punjabi Suba for which the fasts had been undertaken was still far away (Anand 1976, p. 264).

The struggle for a Punjabi Suba had been a major political demand of the Akalis since 1959. The Congress challenged the Akalis to prove their strength in the Punjabi-speaking areas of Punjab in the 1962 elections. The results belied the hopes of the Akalis. Master Tara Singh's new slogan was 'Khalsa Panth will either be a ruler or a rebel'. He asked the followers: "The Hindus got Hindustan, the Muslims got Pakistan and what did the Sikhs get?" in 1962 Sant Fateh Singh stole the limelight by wresting the leadership of the party from Master Tara Singh. It ended the hegemony of the urban higher caste leadership. Sant Fateh Singh condemned the separatist attitude of the earlier leadership and emphasized the bonds existing between the Hindus and the Sikhs (Datta 1993, p. 64).

Third General Elections, held in 1962, further exposed the weakness of the Akalis who contested elections on the slogan of the Punjabi Suba and secured only 19 out of 154 seats in the Punjab assembly. They could not win a majority even in the Punjabi-speaking region of the Punjab. Congress party could claim to represent the Sikhs better than the Akali Dal, for 31 Sikhs were elected on the Congress party 'ticket' as against 19 Sikhs on the Akali Dal 'label'. The Akalis fared badly even in the by-elections that were held during the next three years (Anand 1976, p. 264).

In 1963, Akali Dal was split into two separate political parties, one led by Master Tara Singh and the other by Sant Fateh Singh. The latter's Akali Dal gathered greater strength among the rural Jat Akalis and demonstrated its strength among the Sikhs against Master's Akali Dal by winning 95 out of 138 elective seats in the SGPC elections held in January 1965. Master Tara Singh was so shocked by this defeat that he went into a self-imposed exile from Akali politics. But in July 1965, he returned back to the politics and raised the slogan of a 'self-determined status for the Sikhs within the Union of India. A conference held at Ludhiana, Gurunam Singh, then a close advisor of Master Tara Singh, moved a resolution. The resolution complained of discrimination against the Sikhs and demanded that Sikhs should be given political power as only this could help them to solve their problems. This new slogan was shrewd attempt by the 82 year old Akali leader to stage a 'come-back to Akali politics'. It constituted a serious challenge to Sant Fateh Singh's leadership as it implied that Sant Fateh Singh had

failed to act purposefully for securing the Punjabi Suba during the period of Master Tara Singh's self-imposed exile (Ibid., p. 265).

Sant Fateh Singh took up the challenge. He decided to act decisively, but he carefully distinguished his own conception of the Punjabi Suba from that of Master Tara Singh. In the first place, Sant Fateh Singh's Punjabi Suba was presented as a purely linguistic demand for a Punjabi-speaking state; secondly he laid great emphasis on the need for preserving Hindu-Sikh unity. To pursue this object, he met Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in August 1965, and communicated to him his resolve that unless the Punjabi-speaking state was formed within 25 days, he would undertake a 'fast unto death' on 10th September 1965, and if he survived it for fifteen days, he would immolate himself by burning on the 16th day. In the meantime, Indo-Pakistan was broke out. Considerable pressure was exerted on the Sant to postpone his fast. The working committee of Akali Da (Sant) also passed a resolution to that intent. The Sant announced on 9th September 1965 that he would put off his intended fast to some later day after the hostilities ended (Ibid., pp. 265-266).

The Government of India realized the need for meeting the Akali demand for the Punjabi Suba. The country could not afford to ignore the demand of a very considerable section of the Sikhs. The Sant's demand had been only postponed, not given up. The Akali's demand for the creation of Punjabi Suba received indirect support from the Hindus in Haryana region. The Haryana leadership had been sore over the neglect of the Haryana region in respect of economic and social development by the Punjab government largely dominated by Punjabi-region leadership. They took advantage of the situation and pressed their claims for the formation of a separate Haryana state. The Hindus in the Punjabi-speaking region alone opposed the demand (Ibid., p. 266).

Till 1964, the main opposition to a Punjabi Suba came from Pratap Singh Kairon, himself a Sikh, leader of the Congress Party of Punjab, and Chief Minister from 1956 to 1964, who had the full backing of Nehru. Among the population, opposition to the idea came from a section of urban Hindu businessmen from the Punjabi region of the state. This group feared that the demand for a Punjabi Suba

on the basis of language was merely a stratagem for the attainment of Sikh hegemony (Mitra 2006, p. 90). The years of the Congress dominance came to an end with the exit of Kairon from power. He found guilty of the abuse of the authority and exploitation of his position for the personal gains, Kairon had to resign as Chief Minister on 15th June 1964, and shortly thereafter was assassinated (Ibid., p. 91).

Thus, the politics of Punjab since 1947 is dominated by the Congress party because of Mr. Kairon who was Sikh, another thing which helped the Congress to dominate the Punjab politics. He was responsible to select the Sikh candidates in the party. The tactic of Congress proved successful.

On 23rd September 1965, immediately after the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the Government of India announced the appointment of a three member Cabinet committee to consider the question of the Punjabi Suba. This committee, headed by Sardar Hukam Singh, recommended that the present state of Punjab be reorganized on linguistic basis and also recommended the setting up of a committee to adjust the boundaries between the states of Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. Punjab Boundary Commission was set up in April 1966 under the chairmanship of Justice J.C. Shah of the Supreme Court of India. The commission's recommendations with some modifications were incorporated into the Punjab Reorganisation Bill, which was approved in 1966 (Anand 1976, pp. 266-267).

While in Haryana, the Punjab-Reorganisation Act was welcomed in Punjab it aroused the opposition of both the Sikhs and the Punjabi Hindus. The Punjabi Hindus opposed it because it had placed them in a minority in the new state. The re-organisation of Punjab gave to the Sikhs a majority in the new state but did not fully satisfy the Akalis. Sant Akali Das opposed it because (a) it had excluded allegedly predominantly Punjabi-speaking areas of Chandigarh, Fatehabad, Sirsa, Ambala Sadar, part of Una Tehsil etc. from Punjab; (b) It had placed the management of Bhakra dam complex outside the control of Punjab, (c) It had retained some 'common links' between Punjab and Haryana. Master Tara Singh's Akali Dal, went further and expressed their resentment by burning a copy of the

Punjab Re-organisation Bill, observing 25th September as 'protest day' and by asking its members in Lok Sabha to stage a walk out. The Akali resentment over the Reorganization Act was expressed through the agitations and 'morchas' during the five years (Ibid., p. 269). The reorganization of Punjab had a considerable impact on the electoral prospects of political parties. The Akali Dal gained maximum benefit by the reorganization. In the composite Punjab, the Akalis could never hope to win majority of the seats. Infact, in the previous elections, they had won almost all their seats from Punjabi-speaking areas. Communist parties were also benefited as the CPI(M) and CPI's traditional mass base had been in the Punjabi speaking areas (Ibid., p. 271).

The Congress which had been drawing its support from both the Hindi-speaking and the Punjabi-speaking areas of the composite Punjab has stood to lose by the reorganization of Punjab. Immediate, impact of the reorganization was particularly unfavourable to the Congress – both the Hindus and the Sikhs – moved away from it, though for different reasons. The Hindus blamed it for accepting the claims of the Akalis for a Punjabi-speaking state and the Sikhs criticized it for keeping Chandigarh and some other allegedly Punjabi-speaking areas outside the reorganized Punjab (Ibid., p. 271). The political party suffered the most was the Jana Sangh that was confined only to the Urban Hindus, could never hope to improve its electoral prospects in Punjab (Datta 1993, p. 65).

From 1952 to 1962 the Punjab politics was not as smooth as politics of other states. Congress at the centre and in states enjoyed dominating position. Opposition was meager. But in case of the Punjab, the congress besides the fact formed government at the state level from 1952 to 1967. Faced the challenges from the Akalis, their policies and programme in the state were decided according to the Akali politics. In Punjab at the state level there was multi-party system. It is considered to be multi-party because Akali segments and Jana Sngh competed in the elections as well as determined the government decisions. Hence the parties enjoyed political sovereignty.

After the establishment of the Punjabi-speaking state the Akalis found it necessary to redefine their political objectives and strategies. The two groups led

by Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh took different positions on the question of nature of federalism. Tara Singh Akali Dal continued to assert that there was no other alternative left for the Sikhs in the interests of self-preservation than to frame their demand for a self-determined political status within the republic of the Union of India. The Sant Akali Dal took a moderate stand reiterating the charge of discrimination against Punjab (Datta 1993, p. 65).

In December 1966, Sant Fateh Singh announced that he would go for fast unto death, if his three demands were not conceded. These demands were: (i) the common links between Punjab and Haryana should be snapped; (ii) Chandigarh and certain other Punjabi-speaking areas should be given to Punjab; (iii) and the Bhakra and Beas Project should be handed over to Punjab. In the meantime, Master Tara Singh's Akali Dal passed a 'Sikh Homeland' resolution at the Ludhiana on 11th December 1966. The resolution demanded that the 'Sikh Homeland' should be granted 'autonomous constitutional status such as Jammu & Kashmir now had', and post for Sikhs in the government services should be 'statutorily reserved'. But this extremist slogan failed to win Master Tara Singh much support from the Sikh masses. Sant Fateh Singh had also given up the idea of self-immolation on the assurance, that Prime Minister would arbitrate on the issue of Chandigarh and Bhakra Dam (Anand 1976, pp. 272-273).

Thus it can be said that even after the formation of a new state on the language basis, Akalis were unsatisfied. After that they were demanding more autonomy for the state within the Union, which was purely against constitutional arrangements and also against the unity of the nation.

What ever the ethics of fasting and immolation plan and its future liabilities, the Sant's fast raised his political stock. It also barred the door to electoral alliance with the Congress of which there had been some talk before the fast. It further set the stage for the emergence of the United Front (UF) of opposition parties with the Sant Akali at the Centre and other political parties-two Communist Parties, Republican Party and the SSP-playing the satellite. Jana Sangh and Master Akali Dal remained aloof (Anand 1976, Ibid., p. 275).